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SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO?  
FOUNDER POWER AND EXIT VIA INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 
ABSTRACT 
Founders can voluntarily exit their ventures via initial public offerings (IPOs). In this study, 
we build on power theory to develop and test a model of founder exit using a dataset of 313 
founders from 177 entrepreneurial IPOs between 2002 and 2010. We largely find support for 
the model—a negative relationship between founder power and full exit. To capture the 
underlying mechanism of the power-exit relationship, we conducted two experiments in which 
we randomly assigned decision makers to either a high- or low-power condition. We find that 
decision makers in the low-power condition are more likely to use a full exit via IPO than those 
in the high-power condition and that frustration mediates this relationship. However, founders 
can also engage in partial exits, including a managerial partial exit in which the founder leaves 
management but keeps ownership and a financial partial exit in which the founder divests 
ownership but remains in management. We find that the negative relationship between founder 
power and exit is more negative for full exits than partial exits. With this paper, we contribute 
to the literature on exit by identifying a novel mechanism—frustration—underlying power’s 
influence on the likelihood and type of founder exit. 
 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial exit, founder power, IPO, frustration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Founder exit is a key event in the entrepreneurial process (Aldrich, 2015; DeTienne & 
Wennberg, 2016; Wasserman, 2003). However, despite considerable scholarly interest in 
founder entry through the creation of new ventures (De Carolis, Litzky, & Eddleston, 2009; 
Eesley, 2016; Haveman, Habinek, & Goodman, 2012; Newbert & Tornikoski, 2012), only 
recently has there been a concerted effort to understand how and why founders exit their 
ventures (DeTienne, 2010; DeTienne, McKelvie, & Chandler, 2015). Founder exit has been 
found to be more likely for ventures that are older, larger, and at a later stage of development 
presumably because these ventures’ development has outpaced their founders’ skills and 
knowledge (Boeker & Karidhalil, 2002; Dobrev & Barnett, 2005) such that the founders need 
to be replaced by professional managers (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; DeTienne & Cardon, 
2012; Hambrick & Crozier, 1985; Wasserman, 2003).  
Although there has been research on why founders are forced to exit when their 
ventures are performing well (Ewens & Marx, 2017; Wasserman, 2003) and performing poorly 
(Laitinen, 1992; Wiklund, Baker, & Shepherd, 2010) as well as why founders choose to exit 
their ventures to avoid further losses (DeTienne, Shepherd, & De Castro, 2008; Gimeno et al., 
1997; Thorburn, 2000), there has been less research on why founders might decide to leave 
their successful ventures (DeTienne & Wennberg, 2016). This insufficient scholarly attention 
on founders’ exits from high-potential ventures is surprising. In particular, we focus on initial 
public offerings (IPOs), which firm stakeholders perceive as a sign of high venture 
performance (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007; Shane & Stuart, 2002) and firm founders 
view as a primary vehicle to harvest their investments in their ventures. 
The time leading up to an IPO involves considerable uncertainty, negotiation, and 
turmoil for founders (Certo et al., 2001; Krigman, Shaw & Womack, 1999; Pollock, Rindova, 
& Maggitti, 2008). This period of uncertainty creates a context that invites the use of power 
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(Finkelstein, 1992; Mintzberg, 1983) because, under uncertainty, decisions are not 
programmable or easily specified (Tushman, 1977) and thus people likely differ in their 
preferred choices—i.e., there are conflicting preferences (Mintzberg, 1983; Pettigrew, 1973).  
In situations of conflicting preferences, power is used to influence decisions and outcomes 
(Finkelstein, 1992; Pettigrew, 1973) creating winners and losers in an atmosphere of frustration 
(Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Pettigrew, 1973). Indeed, lack of power emerged as an 
important cause of founder exit in our exploratory interviews (see Appendix 1 for a description 
of these interviews), as the following quote illustrates:  
The IPO was a difficult process. You find that your shareholding is very much reduced; 
you no longer have power over the company; and on top, you have many people that 
don’t understand the business, make bad decisions, and they don’t even listen. And I 
think this was the same for a lot of people that went through an IPO and then exited. 
  
Given that power is useful in uncertain contexts, such as those surrounding an IPO, we ask the 
following: how and why does founders’ power influence their decision to exit from their 
ventures via IPO?  
To address the above question, we build on theories of power (Child, 1972; Finkelstein, 
1992; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Nakauchi & Wiersema, 2015) and frustration (Fox & 
Spector, 1999; Spector, 2002; Storms & Spector, 1987) to theorize on how founders’ lack of 
power at the time of IPO leads them to exit their ventures (rather than continue with their 
ventures) and how power is more explanatory for full exits than for partial exits. To test our 
power model of founder exit, we constructed a novel dataset of 313 founders from the total 
population of 177 first-time listings of UK entrepreneurial firms on the London Stock 
Exchange between 2002 and 2010 and used binary and multinomial regression for the analyses. 
The findings from these initial analyses largely support our proposed model. Following a 
mixed-methods approach (Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Molina-Azorin, 2012), we also 
conducted two experiments. The first experiment (181 entrepreneurial decision makers) 
provides evidence of causality, and the second experiment (190 managers taking an 
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entrepreneurship course) captures frustration as the underlying mechanism in the relationship 
between founders’ power and venture exit.  
Through our theorizing and findings, we make four primary contributions to the 
literature on entrepreneurial exits. First, prior research on founder exit has focused on the 
reasons why “others” decide to replace founders from their highly (Ewens & Marx, 2017; 
Wasserman, 2003) and poorly (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Laitinen, 1992; Wiklund, Baker, & 
Shepherd, 2010) performing ventures and how founders “close down” their ventures to avoid 
bankruptcy (DeTienne et al., 2008; Gimeno et al., 1997; Shepherd, Wiklund, & Haynie, 2009). 
We extend this stream of research by providing new insights into why founders decide to exit 
their high-potential ventures via IPO. Specifically, over and above the potential financial 
incentives for founders’ to exit their firms, we explain the role that power (i.e., low power) 
plays in this exit decision.  
Second, the extant literature has investigated founders’ exit strategies (Bruce & Picard, 
2006; Ryan & Power, 2012) and modes of exit (DeTienne, et al., 2015; Wennberg, Wiklund, 
DeTienne, & Cardon, 2010) and has explained the likelihood of exit (Cefis & Marsili, 2012; 
DeTienne et al., 2008; Gimeno et al., 1997). The often implicit assumption in this stream of 
research is that founder exit is “all or nothing”: the founder either exits completely from the 
venture—full exit—or continues fully with his or her venture. We extend this current 
conversation of founder exit (or not) to highlight founders’ use of managerial and financial 
partial exits. We provide insights into the nature of partial exits and distinguish them from full 
exits based on the role of founder power. 
Third, prior research has highlighted a “coercive” effect of power on exit; CEOs (Allen 
& Panian, 1982; Boecker, 1992; Shen & Cannella, 2002) and founder-CEOs in particular 
(Wasserman, 2003) can lose power and consequently be forced out. We propose an alternate 
role of power—namely, a mechanism that involves the mediating effect of frustration in the 
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relationship between low power and the founders’ decision to exit. We also reveal how this 
frustration mechanism differs for full exits vis-à-vis partial exits. Finally, by doing so, we add 
to the entrepreneurship literature on the role of emotions in starting (e.g., passion [Baron, 2008; 
Cardon et al., 2005]) and closing a venture (e.g., grief [Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd, Wiklund, & 
Haynie, 2009]) by highlighting the role of frustration in founders’ decisions to exit their 
ventures. 
This paper proceeds as follows: First, we introduce the IPO event, distinguish CEO 
dismissal from founder exit, theorize on founder exit based on low power over the venture, and 
distinguish full exits from partial exits based on the role of power. Second, we describe the 
method for Study 1, which is based on secondary data, and offer the corresponding results. 
Third, we detail the method for Study 2, which is based on two experiments, and present the 
corresponding results. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of the current 
study for the exit literature. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The literature on the IPO phenomenon has largely focused on explaining the success of 
a venture’s IPO based on, for example, the involvement of venture capitalists (Brav & Gompers, 
1997; Gompers, 1996), the reputation of underwriters (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Ellis, 
Michaely, & O’hara, 2000), the composition of the board of directors (Certo, 2003; Filatotchev 
& Bishop, 2002; Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007), and the replacement of the founder as CEO in 
preparation for the IPO (Jain & Tabak, 2008; Pollock, Fund, & Baker, 2009). Of particular 
interest to our study, replacing the founder CEO in preparation for an IPO appears to be a 
strategic decision forced on the founder by powerful investors who lack confidence in the 
founder’s ability to continue to manage and grow the company (Jain & Tabak, 2008; 
Wasserman, 2003 and 2008).  
IPO Context and CEO Dismissal 
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As mentioned earlier, IPOs are shrouded in uncertainty, negotiation, and political 
turmoil (Certo et al., 2001; Krigman et al., 1999; Pollock et al., 2008), creating a context that 
invites the use of power (Finkelstein, 1992; Mintzberg, 1983). Indeed, considerations of power 
were prominent in our exploratory interviews, specifically regarding exit. For example, one 
founder noted the following:  
Losing power and influence over the business is the fear that entrepreneurs have: they 
believe in their own decision making, rightly or wrongly, and therefore, when they lose 
that ability for their decision making to affect their wealth, then they would rather pack 
their bags and make their own decisions somewhere else.  
 
In the context of top management, power refers to an actor’s capacity to exert his or her 
will on organizational decisions and actions (Finkelstein, 1992; French & Raven. 1959; 
Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971).1 For instance, top managers’ power has 
been shown to influence strategic decisions, organizational processes, and performance 
outcomes (Child, 1972; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996; Nakauchi & Wiersema, 2015). Power derives from a manager’s formal 
position in the hierarchy (what is called structural power), but there are also other sources of 
power, such as power from ownership, expertise, and prestige (Finkelstein, 1992). The 
literature has informed us that even CEOs who have, by definition, high structural power are 
more likely to be dismissed from their ventures when they lack other forms of power to 
influence decisions (Allen & Panian, 1982; Boeker, 1992; Ocasio, 1994; Weisbach, 1988).  
In the context of an IPO, since it creates a liquid market for a venture’s stock, it 
creates an opportunity for founders to voluntarily exit their ventures (Poulsen & Stegemoller, 
                                                 
1 In this study, we conceptualize power as an individual attribute rather than a relational concept (Fleming & 
Spicer, 2014). Thus, power is based on the focal actor’s attributes (e.g., structural role, expertise, ownership, and 
prestige), which reflect the actor’s perceived capacity to exert his or her will (Finkelstein, 1992), rather than 
power as the obverse of relational dependence in a bilateral relationship (Emerson, 1962). Therefore, our 
conceptualization is individual and subjective rather than dyadic and objective. We adopt this conceptualization 
of power because it is suitable for explaining individual-level decisions (e.g., founder exit decisions), which are 
affected by perceptions of power, consistent with research on CEOs and corporate governance (Cannella & 
Shen, 2001; Krause, Priem, & Love, 2015; Krause, Filatotchev, & Bruton, 2016; Ocasio, 1994; Zazac & 
Westphal, 1996).  
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2008; Wennberg & DeTienne, 2014). Founder exit from a venture via IPO is distinct from the 
phenomenon of CEO dismissal for a number of reasons. First, CEO dismissal is an 
involuntary exit from a role (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002), whereas founder exit via IPO is 
typically a voluntary decision. Since nobody can “force” founders to sell their shares, full 
exits and financial partial exits of founders are, by definition, voluntary acts. Managerial 
partial exits also happen by choice, on most occasions. While, in theory at least, a founder 
can be fully forced out of management, there is evidence that the majority of “replaced” 
founder-CEOs remain in their companies in different managerial roles (Rubenson & Gupta, 
1992; Wasserman, 2003). Our exploratory interviews indicated that even “replaced” founders 
who leave their companies, do so after turning down offers to stay in different managerial 
roles. Indeed, investors prefer founders to remain involved in some managerial capacity even 
when removed from the helm (Wasserman, 2008). As a founder put it, “investors totally 
ousting a founder from the venture at IPO—not just from the CEO role—is such drastic 
action, sending the wrong market signals, and is, therefore, a rare event.”  
Founder exit is also different from CEO dismissal because, compared to hired CEOs, 
founders are more likely to strongly identify with and have an emotional attachment to the 
ventures they created (Dobrev & Barnett 2005; Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Shepherd, 2003). 
Finally, the impact of power on CEO dismissal has largely been considered from the 
perspective of investors exercising power under conditions of poor firm performance (Allen & 
Panian, 1982; Boeker, 1992; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002). Therefore, 
current arguments and findings on power and CEO dismissal are unlikely to be directly 
transferable to founder exit via IPO, to which we now turn.  
Founder Power and Full Venture Exit via IPO 
At the time of IPO, individual founders may have already given up some (or most) 
control over their ventures’ strategic decision making (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Nelson, 
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2003); however, founders can still influence the direction of their ventures via soft power. Soft 
power is based on “subtle influence mechanisms that cause others to willingly behave in ways 
that benefit the focal agent,” which is distinct from hard power, which is based on “coercion, 
direct rewards, and extensive resource deployment to force others’ behaviors” (Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2009: 663; Nye, 2004). The following statement from an interview with a founder 
indicates the influence exerted by soft power:  
My soft power comes largely from alignment, and that is in two ways: the first way, 
internally, the internal team works well with me. . . . The more important one has to do 
with the external stakeholders. So, in order to replace me, they would need to find 
someone that could command the same alignment. . . . Since that is not easy, I remain 
influential, and people listen to what I have to say. 
 
However, not all founders can maintain this sort of soft power. When founders lack 
power, they likely become frustrated by their inability to exercise their will over their ventures 
(that they [co]created), which may ultimately influence their exit decisions. Frustration is a 
negative emotional state caused by “interference with goal attainment or goal-oriented activity” 
(Spector, 1978: 816). In simple terms, frustration occurs when something or someone blocks 
one’s efforts toward a desired goal (Fox & Spector, 1999). For example, Buchholtz, Amason, 
and Rutherford (2005) found that when the top management team is not given sufficient 
discretion to make strategic decisions (i.e., they have low power), they become frustrated. 
Similarly, Buono, Bowditch, and Lewis (1985) found that managers of acquired firms often 
lose power and feel frustrated as a result. Indeed, it appears that low power has the potential to 
transform an individual’s psychology (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003)—that is, to 
change the lens by which information is interpreted (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Fiske, 1993; 
Galinsky, et al., 2006; Smith & Trope, 2006). For example, individuals with low power 
perceive negative situations as more threatening than those with high power (Keltner et al., 
2003) because they perceive a lack of control to rectify such situations (Fast, et al., 2009; 
Spector & Fox, 2002; White & Ruh, 1973).  
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In our context, low-power founders are likely to experience frustration at IPO because 
IPOs often involve transformational changes in ventures (Fischer & Pollock, 2004). This 
frustration is likely to be especially high when founders lack the power to respond to such 
changes (Daily & Johnson, 1997; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988) and when the changes affect 
objects they feel strong ownership over (Bartunek, 1993). The following quote from a founder 
reflects the relationship between low power (i.e., blocked influence) and frustration well:  
You get the chairman and other people in the board to say “Right, this is what we want 
to do now,” and the business becomes different from what you first intended. For me, 
it was more the case of going down a particular route for the product. But I felt that the 
rest of the board was more interested in raising more money, bringing the product to 
market. . . . When you lose the liberty to drive something the biggest feeling you 
experience is actually frustration. Frustration! 
 
Frustration, such as that experienced from low power, leads to three possible behavioral 
reactions in the organizational context (Maier, 1949; Spector, 1978). First, a somewhat 
common reaction to mild frustration is to find an alternative path to achieve one’s original goal 
(Fox & Spector, 1999; Spector, 1978). Second, frustration can lead to aggression toward those 
obstructing the path to the actor’s goal (e.g., Dollard et al., 1939; Storms & Spector, 1987). 
The third possible response to frustration is withdrawal from the situation (e.g., disengagement 
[Rothmann & Hamukang’andu, 2013], intention to quit [Spector & Michaels, 1986], and 
turnover [Marrow, 1972; O’Connor et al., 1984]). Withdrawal usually happens under 
conditions of high frustration, especially when other courses of action are inhibited and 
aggression is punished (Lazar et al., 2006; Spector, 1978; Storms & Spector, 1987). Indeed, 
because those low in power perceive change (e.g., changes from going public [Fischer & 
Pollock, 2004; Williams, 2013]) as threatening (Cortina & Magley, 2009; Keltner et al., 2003), 
they are likely to withdraw from the situation altogether (Fugate, Prussia, & Kinicki, 2012; 
McCrae, 1984). Therefore, founders frustrated from low power may decide to have nothing to 
do with their firms and may thus fully exit via IPO. As one founder put it,  
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I left fully! I found that being on the stock market was an incredibly horrible experience. 
I wanted to leave because I thought the board was making bad decisions, and I had no 
confidence in my business partners, and there is no way I would have kept equity in 
something I had no control over and did not think it was running in ways in which I 
wished to run it. For me, there was only one option: take my money and go. I did not 
want to be involved in management after leaving. I did not want anything to do with 
the people on the board after I left. 
 
Based on the above, we propose that founders’ lack of power can lead to frustration and 
withdrawal from their ventures—namely, full exit. We offer two hypotheses regarding full 
exits—one about the direct relationship between power and full exit and the other on the 
mediating role of frustration:  
Hypothesis 1. The lower a founder’s power at IPO, the more likely he or she will fully 
exit from the venture via IPO vis-à-vis maintaining involvement in the venture. 
Hypothesis 2. Frustration mediates the relationship between a founder’s power at IPO 
and his or her likelihood of fully exiting via IPO vis-à-vis maintaining involvement in 
the venture. That is, a founder’s power at IPO is negatively related to frustration, and 
frustration is positively related to full exit. 
 
Founder Power and Partial Venture Exit via IPO 
As we mentioned earlier, full exit or full continuation are not the only choices open to 
founders via IPO; some founders may decide to partially exit their ventures. Specifically, a 
founder can resign from his or her managerial position but keep ownership shares in the 
venture (i.e., a managerial partial exit) or can sell his or her ownership shares in the venture 
but retain a managerial role (i.e., a financial partial exit). While lack of power could still lead 
to a partial exit, we theorize that a founder’s lack of power is more influential in full exits 
than in partial exits. Specifically, lack of power has a strong impact on complete withdrawal 
(Lazar et al., 2006; Marrow, 1972; O’Connor et al., 1984; Spector, 1978; Storms & Spector, 
1987)—in this case, full exit—because powerful actors obstruct the individual from pursuing 
and achieving desired outcomes, which causes frustration and, consequently, withdrawal 
(Fast, et al., 2009; Spector & Fox, 2002; White & Ruh, 1973). Compared to a full exit, a 
partial exit represents a finer-grained course of action that founders can engage in for 
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multiple purposes unrelated to low power. Moreover, partial exits are not well suited for 
dealing with frustration from low power because frustration tends to spill over into other 
domains. We elaborate below.  
A partial exit provides a mechanism for founders to realign their evolved roles in their 
ventures with their desired goals, which may be unrelated to frustration from low power. 
Specifically, ventures can evolve (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Fisher, Kotha, & Lahiri, 2016), 
and so too can founders’ goals (Collewaert, et al., 2016; Levesque, Shepherd, & Douglas, 
2002). A partial exit can help founders realign their evolved managerial roles in their 
ventures with their desired managerial goals. Indeed, one founder told us, “I am a serial 
entrepreneur, and it is natural for me to start something new after the IPO. I love this 
business, but my work is done here.” Another founder told us the following: “I was kind of 
tired of running the business, and I wanted to have more time off for other things in my life 
(my family, my music, etc.). On the other hand, I knew that the company could grow more. 
Why sell?” Such a desired change in lifestyle has little to do with frustration from low power 
and can be addressed through a managerial partial exit.  
Founders can also choose financial partial exits to reflect the evolution of their 
ventures and changes in their personal goals. For example, after IPO, a venture may no 
longer need its founder’s investment to grow further (e.g., Black & Gilson, 1998; Certo et al., 
2001), and/or with increased wealth from venture success, a founder may become more risk 
averse (consistent with prospect theory [Tversky & Kahneman, 1981]) such that he or she 
financially exits the venture to re-invest this personal wealth in a more diverse set of assets. 
As explained by a founder who used a financial partial exit, “I enjoyed my role in the 
company; running R&D is an exciting and influential job. I just found a good chance to cash 
out my shares. There were no hard feelings when I sold.” Therefore, while full exits can arise 
from founders’ frustration due to lack of power over their ventures, partial exits represent a 
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more nuanced approach by founders attempting to realign either their managerial or financial 
roles to the current circumstances regardless of their level of power over their ventures.  
Furthermore, as power in a role decreases, frustration with that role likely increases. 
These feelings of frustration can spill over into the individual’s other roles, which makes a 
partial exit less effective for dealing with the low-power situation. Spillover in the 
organizational context highlights how an individual’s perceptions, emotions, and behaviors 
generated by an event in one domain influence his or her perceptions, emotions, and 
behaviors in another domain (Judge & Illies, 2004; Kahn, et al., 1964; Rantanen, et al., 2008). 
For example, frustrations at work can spill over into the home, and frustrations at home can 
spill over into work (Bolger, et al., 1989; Judge et al., 2006). Indeed, Takeuchi, Yun, and 
Tesluk (2002) found that expatriates specific issues related to living conditions developed 
into a generalized frustration with the host country investigated, which in turn reduced their 
overall job satisfaction. In turn, job dissatisfaction among expatriates has been associated 
with withdrawal intentions, such as prematurely terminating assignments and returning home 
early (Parker & McEvoy, 1993; Shaffer & Harrison, 1998). Therefore, it appears that 
frustration in one domain at work can spill over to influence a “global attitude toward the 
organization”—that is, a belief that there is an unbalanced social exchange with the 
organization (Neves, 2012: 966). For example, an employee’s negative global attitude about 
the organization may spill over to that employee’s negative attitude about his or her 
supervisor (Stinglhamber & Vandenberghe, 2003; Vandenberghe, Bentein & Stinglhamber, 
2004). Similarly, an employee’s negative emotions at work, such as frustration, can reduce 
his or her affective commitment to the organization (Ng, Feldman & Lam, 2010)—namely, 
reduce his or her identification with the organization (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986) such that 
he or she is less willing to “give energy and loyalty to the organization” (Kanter, 1968: 499). 
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This reduced affective commitment can lead to withdrawal in the form of absenteeism and 
turnover (Somers, 1995).  
In our context, as the founder loses power and feels greater frustration in one domain 
(e.g., the founder’s managerial role), that frustration is likely to spill over into other domains 
(e.g., the founder’s ownership role). In such an instance of “spilled-over” frustration, a partial 
exit (e.g., a managerial partial exit) is less likely to address the founder’s negative global 
attitude toward the venture, and as a result, the founder is more likely to turn to a full exit. In 
other words, a partial exit is less effective for dealing with founders’ frustration from low 
power than a full exit.  
Based on the above two lines of reasoning that (1) founders sometimes use partial 
exits for purposes unrelated to power and (2) founders’ partial exits are not well suited for 
dealing with frustration from low power, we offer the following:  
Hypothesis 3. A founder’s power at IPO has a weaker association with his or her 
likelihood of a partial exit (managerial and financial) than a full exit from the venture 
via IPO.  
 
METHODS  
Overview 
To test the relationship between founder power and exit via IPO, we used a mixed-
methods approach (Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Molina-Azorin, 2012). Specifically, we 
conducted two complementary studies: (1) an observational study with archival data from the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) to test the main effects in a large sample and (2) a lab study 
consisting of two randomized experiments with entrepreneurial decision makers to establish 
causality, control for alternative explanations, and observe the mechanism for the effects 
(mediation). We begin with Study 1. 
STUDY 1 
Data and Sample 
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We started with an initial sample of all UK companies that listed on the main market 
of the LSE and the sub-market of the LSE (AIM) for smaller growing companies between 2002 
and 2010, resulting in a total of 2,180 firms. Consistent with the work by Filatotchev and 
Bishop (2002), we excluded firms falling into the following categories: (1) cases of re-
admission and those transferred from the AIM to the main market (917 firms) because these 
firms were not listed for the first time; (2) investment trust IPOs (462 firms) because these 
organizations have unique governance characteristics that make it difficult to identify the 
founders (Chahine, Filatotchev, & Wright, 2007); (3) IPOs representing de-mergers, equity 
carve-outs, reverse takeovers, or equity re-organizations (45 firms) because these do not 
represent entrepreneurial ventures; (4) investment and acquisition vehicles (233 firms) since 
the founders are typically no longer involved with these ventures; and (5) firms incorporated 
more than 10 years before IPO (234 firms) because we focus on entrepreneurial exits, so we 
wanted to ensure the firms in our sample were still in the entrepreneurial phase of their life 
cycle (also consistent with Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1990; Talaulicar, Grundei, & Werder, 2005). Using company prospectuses, we also identified 
and eliminated firms that were subsidiaries (32 firms) and spinoffs (20 firms) as well as firms 
for which it was not possible to identify the founders (60 firms) (Jain & Kini, 1999; Kroll, 
Walters, & Le, 2007). This selection process resulted in a final sample of 313 founders nested 
in 177 entrepreneurial firms at risk of full or partial exit at the time of IPO.  
Dependent Variables 
We aimed to predict these founders’ exits from the listed companies within 24 months 
after their lock-up period. Lock-ups are contractual agreements between existing shareholders 
and underwriters stating that the shareholders will not sell their shares for a specified period. 
Lock-up agreements in the United Kingdom vary between 6 and 24 months (Espenlaub, 
Goergen, & Khurshed, 2001). We chose 24 months after the end of the lock-up period as a 
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cutoff point because founders can realistically sell all their shares during this time. A longer 
period would make any exit distal from the IPO, which is our focal anchor event, and a shorter 
period could be problematic since insiders can sell their shares only to the underwriter during 
the first 12 months after the lock-up period. 
As we discussed above, founders can exit their ventures in full or in part—managerially 
or financially. We operationalize a full exit as when a founder leaves the top management team 
and the board of directors and holds less than 3% ownership of the firm 24 months after the 
lock-up period. We used a 3% shareholding cutoff because below 3% is considered negligible 
by the investment community and is not reported in annual reports. We operationalize a 
managerial partial exit as when a founder leaves the top management team and the board of 
directors but still holds 3%, or more, ownership in the venture 24 months after the lock-up 
period. We operationalize a financial partial exit as when a founder sells all his or her shares 
but remains in the top management team and on the board of directors (as presented in the 
annual report) 24 months after the lock-up period.  
Independent Variables 
Finkelstein (1992) built upon earlier work on individual power (French & Raven, 1959) 
to offer four dimensions of managerial power: structural, ownership, expert, and prestige power 
(see also Bach & Smith, 2007). Following Finkelstein (1992), we set the independent variables 
to be proxies for the four different dimensions of power held by founders at the time of IPO. 
We used the ventures’ IPO prospectuses to collect most of the information for coding, to which 
we now turn. 
Structural power refers to power based on formal organizational structures and 
hierarchical authority (Brass, 1984; Hambrick, 1981). In the context of ventures going for 
IPOs, founders who have the role of CEO or board chair have the opportunity to steer their 
companies toward their visions, so they have high structural power (Finkelstein, 1992). The 
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CEO is the top executive responsible for the venture’s strategy and direction (Boeker & 
Karichalil, 2002). Similarly, the chair of the board can influence the board of directors, which 
is the venture’s ultimate decision-making body (Harrison, Torres, & Kukalis, 1988). Consistent 
with Wasserman (2017), we combined executive and board influence into a categorical 
variable to capture structural power; 0 represents founders who were neither CEO nor 
chairperson, 1 represents founders who were CEO or chair of the board at IPO but did not hold 
both roles together, and 2 represents founder-CEOs who also chaired the board.2  
Ownership power derives from actors’ proportional shareholding (Finkelstein, 1992). 
Ownership helps founders safeguard their influence in public companies; founders with 
relatively large shareholdings have more influence on their boards and can influence important 
decisions (Finkelstein, 1992). Therefore, we operationalized ownership power as a founder’s 
ownership relative to the ownership of the largest shareholder at IPO (consistent with Attig, 
Ghoul, & Guedhami, 2009). We derived this information from the firms’ IPO prospectuses 
(typically in the “Directors’ and other interests” or “Significant shareholdings” sub-sections).  
Expertise power arises from founders’ ability to deal with environmental contingencies 
and contribute to the success of their firms (Crozier, 1964; Hambrick, 1981; Hickson et al., 
1971; Mintzberg, 1983; Tushman & Romanelli, 1983). Expert founders feel more powerful 
(than those with less expertise) because they possess the ability to manage their “grown-up” 
ventures in the new post-IPO environment (Fischer & Pollock, 2004). For example, if a founder 
is the inventor or main developer of the primary product, he or she will enjoy special technical 
status in the company (Ibarra, 1993). Therefore, as the first proxy of expertise power, we 
                                                 
2 As a robustness check, we tried two alternative four-category measures to capture structural power. (1) We 
coded founders who were neither CEO nor chairperson as 0, founders who were chairperson of the board as 1, 
founders who were CEO as 2, and founder-CEOs who were also the chair of their board as 3. This measure 
assumes that the CEO has more structural power than the chairperson. (2) We coded founders who were neither 
CEO nor chairperson as 0, founders who were CEO as 1, founders who were the chairperson as 2, and founder-
CEOs who were also the chair of their board as 3. This measure assumes that the chairperson has more 
structural power than the CEO. The regression results for both these alternative measures of structural power 
were consistent with the reported main results for the three-category measure. 
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measured whether the focal founder was the inventor or the main developer of his or her 
venture’s product (dummy coded 1 and 0 otherwise). Again, we found the relevant information 
in the IPO prospectuses (typically in the introduction, the section on R&D, or the founder’s 
resume). Industry experience is another characteristic linked to expert power (Datta, Guthrie, 
& Rajagopalan, 2002; Haynes & Hillman, 2010). A founder with more industry-specific 
experience generally has better networks, is better equipped to steer the company through 
difficulties, and is more highly regarded by investors (Bach & Smith, 2007; Cooper, Gimeno-
Gascon, & Woo, 1994; Goodall & Pogrebna, 2015; Pennings, Lee, & Witteloostuijn, 1998). 
Therefore, we included relevant industry experience as another proxy of expertise power, 
measured as the number of years the founder worked in an industry related to the focal IPO 
firm before founding his or her firm (Kotha, & George, 2012). We captured founders’ 
experience using the resumes reported in the IPO prospectuses, which we corroborated using 
information from company websites and social media (e.g., LinkedIn). We considered a 
founder’s experience to be relevant if he or she gained that experience in the same Industry 
Classification Benchmark super sector as the focal IPO venture (19 super sectors in total). 
Prestige power derives from people’s status, which influences others’ perceptions of 
their importance (Dalton, Barnes, & Zaleznik, 1968; Finkelstein, 1992). Prestige enhances 
founders’ credibility and makes them legitimate leaders of their companies (D’Aveni, 1990). 
Furthermore, high-prestige founders can improve their firms’ market status (Chahine, et al., 
2011) and therefore perceive themselves as more powerful (Finkelstein, 1992). Founders can 
enhance their prestige power by participating in other firms’ boards of directors (Daily & 
Johnson, 1997), which signals that they belong to a managerial elite and offers access to 
contacts and valuable information (D’Aveni & Kesner, 1993; Tushman & Romanelli, 1983). 
Another way for entrepreneurs to acquire prestige power is to gain popularity through the 
media (Porter & Sallot, 2005), thus becoming figureheads for their firms (Trevino et al., 1990). 
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Therefore, we captured a founder’s prestige power using two proxies: number of directorships 
in other firms during the five years before the IPO (consistent with Finkle, 1998; Higgins & 
Gulati, 2003) and media coverage (Nguyen, 2015). We selected a five-year window for the 
number of directorships because this figure is reported in IPO prospectuses and is visible to 
investment audiences and because prestige from a directorship is not ephemeral (compared to 
the number of current directorships) but has a lasting impact. We calculated media coverage as 
the number of news items mentioning a founder together with his or her company from 
company founding until the IPO. We obtained news data from the Nexis UK database, which 
includes coverage in national and regional newspapers. In line with prior literature (Kotha, 
Rajgogal, & Rindova, 2001; Milbourn, 2003), we randomly inspected approximately 10% of 
the total pieces of media and found that the coverage was overwhelmingly positive. We 
concluded that the extent of potential negative coverage was negligible, and in any case, the 
total media coverage, both positive and negative, increases attention and is positively related 
to personal reputation (Castellucci & Ertug, 2010; Kotha, Rajgogal, & Rindova, 2001; 
Milbourn, 2003). Therefore, we considered total media coverage as a good proxy of founders’ 
prestige power. 
Control Variables 
To rule out alternative explanations for founders’ exit decisions, we included several 
control variables. At the individual level, founder’s age can be a determinant of exit. Compared 
to younger founders, older founders are closer to retirement, which might increase their 
likelihood of exit. Since feelings of attachment to the company may differ between men and 
women (Rosenstein & Horowitz, 1996), we also controlled for founders’ gender, coding female 
1 and male 0. Also, compared to other types of founders, serial entrepreneurs are usually more 
passionate about the initial founding process and are familiar with selling their firms (Cardon, 
Wincent, Singh, & Drnovsek, 2009). We dummy coded serial entrepreneurs (founders who 
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had exited from earlier companies) as 1 and 0 otherwise. Finally, other founders’ power may 
decrease the focal founder’s likelihood of exit if the team is united or increase the focal 
founder’s likelihood of exit if the team is divided (Hellerstedt & Aldrich, 2008). To take into 
account these possibilities, we controlled for the share of ownership of other founders as well 
as the percentage of board seats occupied by other founders at IPO. For example, in a firm 
with two founders who are both members of a board with five seats, the ‘percentage of board 
seats occupied by other founders’ would be 20 (one board seat of the other-cofounder—i.e., 
other than the focal founder—over five board seats in total). 
We also used controls at the firm level. As firms mature, founders may become less 
qualified to manage them, which increases the probability of founder exit (Boeker & Karichalil, 
2002; Dobrev & Barnett, 2005). Therefore, we controlled for firm age, measured as the number 
of months since incorporation. The amount of money founders could gain through selling their 
shares could also influence founder exit, so we controlled for the average market value of the 
firm between IPO and 24 months after the lock-up period. Because firm growth might induce 
a founder to stay, we included annualized turnover growth in the three years before IPO as a 
control. Additionally, companies that receive more private financing before IPO often face 
higher pressure from their institutional investors to replace founders with a professional 
management team (Hellman & Puri, 2002; Wasserman, 2003). Therefore, we included the 
proportion of ownership by institutional investors as a control variable. Moreover, board size 
might influence founder exit. On the one hand, larger boards include broader expertise, which 
decreases the impact of individual founders and may thus facilitate exit (Boeker & Karichalil, 
2002). On the other hand, larger boards with broader expertise could benefit performance, 
which might encourage founders to continue with their firms. We also controlled for length of 
lock-up period in months since it might influence founders’ exit decisions.  
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Finally, we controlled for the influence of the industry and the broader economy. 
Compared to traditional sectors, firms in growing and fast-changing industries need to adjust 
their top management teams’ capabilities more frequently (Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli, 
1992), which might increase the possibility of founder exit after IPO. We dummy coded firms 
operating in information technology (IT) and biotechnology as 1 and 0 otherwise since those 
were rapidly growing and changing industries during the period of analysis. We also controlled 
for hot period effects regarding IPO volume. We dummy coded firms that went public during 
2004 and 2005 as 1 and 0 otherwise because the IPO volume was considerably higher in those 
two years than in the rest of the data period (52% of the total number of IPOs between 2002 
and 2010 happened in 2004 or 2005).  
Method of Analysis  
We first employed a binary probit model to test the relationship between founder power 
and full exit after IPO vis-à-vis maintaining involvement with the business (i.e., continuing or 
exiting partially only). We then employed multinomial logit regression to explore the factors 
associated with the type of founder exit. We created a fine-grained categorical dependent 
variable: continuation, full exit, managerial partial exit, and financial partial exit. The 
multinomial logit model compared the estimates for full exit, managerial partial exit, and 
financial partial exit vis-à-vis continuing with the business. In our sample, 75.7% of the 
founders were part of a founding team and therefore shared the same firm-level data with their 
co-founders. To ensure valid statistical inferences, we applied a robust clustered standard errors 
estimation process to control for possible heteroskedasticity caused by data clustered at the 
firm level (Kennedy, 2003).  
Results 
In Table 1, we observe that among the 313 founders, 40.25% of the founders exited 
from the business within 24 months after the lock-up period and 59.75% fully continued. Of 
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the exits, 61.12% of founders exited from the business totally, 25.40% left management but 
retained ownership, and 13.49% sold all their shares but continued to work in the company in 
some managerial role. We present the descriptive statistics and correlations matrix in Table 2. 
The average age of entrepreneurs in our dataset was 46.32 years, and only 6.71% were female. 
The mean ownership held by each founder was 15.62% at the time of IPO, and 40.58% of them 
were the largest shareholders in their firms. Also, 40.89% of founders held the position of CEO 
or board chair. Specifically, 92 founders (29.39%) were CEOs but not board chairs, 29 founders 
(9.27%) were board chairs but not CEOs, and seven founders (2.24%) held both roles. On 
average, founders had 13.39 years of experience in a related industry before founding their 
companies, 29.07% of founders were serial entrepreneurs, 13.74% of founders were the 
inventors or main developers of their firms’ products; and the founders served on an average 
of 7.31 boards (other than the focal company) in the five years before IPO. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 and then Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
 In Table 3, we present the descriptive statistics for different exit routes. We observe 
differences in the mean values of each power dimension between continuation and full exit. 
These differences, in most cases, are less pronounced between continuation and partial exit 
(managerial or financial) than between continuation and full exit. We note that 35.29% of 
founders who continued were CEOs at IPO compared to 22.08% of founders who had a full 
exit. Founders who continued held 17.93% of ownership at IPO on average compared to 
10.53% for founders who had a full exit and 14.76% for founders who had a managerial partial 
exit. Further, 17.11% of founders who continued were the inventors or main developers of their 
firms’ products compared to 3.90% for founders who had a full exit and 9.38% for founders 
who had a managerial partial exit. Founders who continued had an average of 14.58 years of 
experience working in a related industry compared to 10.58 years for founders who had a full 
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exit and 12.12 years for founders who had a financial partial exit. Founders who continued 
served on 8.09 boards on average during the five years before IPO, whereas founders who had 
a full exit served on 5.49 boards during the same period compared to 6.50 boards for founders 
who had a managerial exit. Finally, founders who continued were reported in the news 15.20 
times on average compared to 12.00 times for founders who had a full exit.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
In Tables 4 and 5, we report the regression results. Model 1 in Table 4 includes the 
control variables, which explain 8.09% of the variance in the dependent variable—founders’ 
full exit (vis-à-vis maintaining involvement). Turnover growth before IPO (beta = -0.159, p 
=0.027) and the average market value of the firm (beta = -0.148, p=0.069) are the statistically 
significant control variables, and both have a negative association with founders’ full exit. 
These findings suggest that pre-IPO growth and high market value of the firm are negatively 
related to full exit (vis-à-vis maintaining involvement).  
The inclusion of the independent variables in Model 2 increases the model’s 
explanatory power significantly by 13.61% to 21.70% of the variance. The categorical variable 
for founders’ CEO/board chair status has a marginally significant negative association with full 
exit (beta = -0.293, p = 0.071) and indicates that founders with greater structural power (CEOs 
and/or board chairs) are less likely to fully exit their ventures via IPO vis-à-vis maintaining 
involvement. Specifically, a one-unit increase on the structural power scale is associated with 
a 7.19% decrease in the likelihood of full exit. The relative proportion of the founder’s 
ownership at IPO has a negative and significant association with full exit (beta = -0.907, p 
=0.002). Specifically, all else equal, one standard deviation more relative ownership at IPO is 
associated with a 8.25% lower probability that the founder will fully exit his or her venture 
after IPO (vis-à-vis maintaining involvement). Being the inventor or main developer of the 
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product (beta = -1.402, p <0.001) and having more industry-related experience (beta = -0.028, 
p = 0.002) have a negative and significant association with founders’ full exit (vis-à-vis 
maintaining involvement). Specifically, on average, being the main developer/inventor is 
associated with a 24.33% lower probability of full exit, and an increase of one standard 
deviation in related industry experience is associated with a 6.83% lower probability of full 
exit. These results suggest that expert power is related to a lower probability that a founder will 
fully exit from his or her venture after IPO (vis-à-vis maintaining involvement). The model 
also shows a negative and significant association between the number of directorships held by 
a founder in other businesses within five years before IPO and the probability of full exit (beta 
=-0.026, p =0.012). Specifically, an increase of one standard deviation in directorships is 
associated with a 5.92% lower probability of full exit. These findings indicate that prestige 
power is related to a lower likelihood of full founder exit after IPO.  
Overall, these results provide support for Hypothesis 1 that the lower a founder’s power 
at IPO, the more likely he or she will fully exit from the venture via IPO vis-a-vis maintaining 
involvement with the venture. Specifically, except for the non-significant results for media 
coverage (beta = 0.024, p = 0.758), all the other proxies for structural, ownership, expertise, 
and prestige power have a significant negative association with founders’ full exits from their 
ventures. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
We then employed multinomial logit regression, using the categorical outcomes of full 
exit, managerial partial exit, and financial partial exit as mutually exclusive dependent 
variables vis-à-vis continuation (see Table 5). First, we observe that the multinomial model 
confirms the binary regression results for full exit. The power dimensions are negatively and 
significantly associated with full exit compared to continuation with the venture even in the 
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presence of the partial exit categories, which increases our confidence in the results supporting 
Hypothesis 1. Regarding the control variables, we see that founders who were serial 
entrepreneurs (beta = 1.345, p =0.002) were 11.66% more likely to have a partial managerial 
exit than founders who were first-time entrepreneurs. Further, one extra year of founder age at 
IPO (beta = 0.052, p =0.050) equates to a 0.30% greater likelihood of partial managerial exit, 
and female founders (beta = 1.320, p = 0.046) were 16.32% more likely to have a partial 
managerial exit than their male counterparts. We also find that male founders (beta = -12.459, 
p <0.001) were 5.79% more likely to have a partial financial exit than female founders and that 
founders of firms that went public during the hot period (beta = 1.916, p =0.014) were 7.22% 
more likely to have a partial financial exit than IPO founders outside the hot period.  
The dimensions for founder power generally have limited association with partial exits 
except for media coverage (beta = -1.000 for news log-transformed, p =0.026): an increase of 
one standard deviation in media coverage (for news log-transformed) decreases the likelihood 
of financial partial exit by 5.07%. Instead, partial exits are associated with factors related the 
founder (e.g., age, gender, and being a serial entrepreneur) and the financial market context 
(i.e., IPO during the hot period).  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Additionally, we measured founder power with an index, calculated by standardizing 
and adding our six proxy measures of power, and compared the effect size of power on 
different exit routes (see Tables 6 and 7). For the power-index models, we also included a 
variable capturing the average market value of the founders’ holding shares, to control for 
the financial incentives to exit. The measure is the product of the amount of shares the focal 
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founder held and the average share price, between the IPO and 24 months after the lock-up 
period3.  
The power index has a significant negative association with full exit vis-à-vis 
continuation, over and above the effects of financial incentives; a one–standard deviation 
decrease in the power index increases the likelihood of full exit by 11.05%. Founder power 
also has a weaker, but still statistically significant, association with partial managerial exit 
vis-à-vis continuation. A one standard deviation decrease in the power index increases the 
likelihood of managerial partial exit by (only) 3.85%. Financial partial exit is not 
significantly explained by founder power. 
Interestingly, regarding the financial incentives, we observed a negative relationship 
between the average value of founders’ holding shares and the probability of exit. When the 
shares appreciate in value, founders might feel more confident in the long-term prospects of 
their firm, which would reduce their desire to exit. This empirical observation could be 
explained by research on the ‘endowment effect’, which shows that by owning an asset, the 
focal person begins to value that asset more, especially if the asset is expensive, and thus the 
person is less likely to sell the asset at its market value (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1991; 
Knetsch & Sinden, 1984; Morewedge & Giblin, 2015).  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 6, 7 & 8 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
In Table 8, we report the contrast of margins between full exit and partial exit for all 
the measures of power, as well as the power index. We find significant differences in the 
increase of the exit probabilities between full and partial exits when power drops for the 
                                                 
3 The market value of the founders’ holding shares could not be used in the models with separate measures of 
power because of multicollinearity issues; the measure was, as expected, highly correlated with ownership 
power (one of the predictors) and with the average market value of the whole business (a control variable).  
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majority of power measures, including the power index. For example, with a one–standard 
deviation decrease in the power index, the probability of full exit increases by 7.45% more (p 
= 0.027) than the probability of managerial partial exit. Additionally, for a one–standard 
deviation decrease in the power index, the probability of full exit increases by 11.82% more 
(p < 0.001) than the probability of financial partial exit. These differences in the effect size 
are both meaningful and statistically significant, suggesting that power is generally a stronger 
predictor of founders’ full exits compared to partial exits (managerial or financial). Overall, 
our results support Hypothesis 3.  
 
Robustness Checks 
 
Founder power and the control variables (e.g., firm performance) may change over time 
after IPO. Thus, to examine the temporal sensitivity of our hypothesized relationships, for each 
venture, we collected longitudinal data for our variables in six-month intervals from the end of 
the lock-up period until 24 months later. With the time-varying variables, we conducted a 
discrete-time hazard model (complementary log-log [cloglog]) (Allison, 1982) and a 
multinomial logit model to examine whether temporary founder power affects the hazard of 
imminent founder exit (within the next six months). Because of missing values in the 
construction of the longitudinal variables, we worked with a slightly smaller sample for these 
longitudinal analyses than the analyses reported above. Specifically, 303 founders were at risk 
of full exit at the end of the lock-up period (1,092 observations for the cloglog regression 
analysis). We then excluded 22 of these 303 founders who had already exited managerially by 
the end of the lock up period, so 281 founders were at risk of all types of exits (including 
managerial partial exit) for the multiple exit route estimation model (1,049 observations).  
In general, the results of the longitudinal analyses provide additional support for our 
hypotheses (see Tables 9 and 10). Founders’ time-varying structural, ownership, expert, and 
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prestige power measured as directorships in other business are all negatively associated with 
the hazard of full exit in the next six-month period. Further, media coverage of the founder has 
limited impact on full exit vis-à-vis maintaining involvement, which is consistent with the 
cross-sectional results.  
Regarding partial exit, we do not observe a significant relationship between founders’ 
temporary power and the hazard of an imminent partial exit, with two exceptions. First, there 
is a negative and significant association between founders’ relative ownership and their hazard 
of partial financial exit. However, this result may be due to the difficulty of selling a large 
number of shares within a short period (Mikkelson & Partch, 1985). In other words, the effect 
could be attributed to the way the model was structured (the amount of ownership at time t 
could be negatively related to the probability of selling all shares within the next six months) 
and thus may not necessarily be a power-related effect.4 Second, structural power is negatively 
associated with managerial partial exit during the following six months. Moreover, the 
longitudinal analyses show that partial exits are associated with founders’ gender and 
experience as a serial entrepreneur as well as with the time of the IPO (hot period) in ways 
consistent with our cross-sectional results. To check the stability of our results, we also carried 
out a number of robustness checks with different specifications and measurements. Specifically, 
we ran models with the exit deadline set at 12 and 18 months after the lock-up period instead 
of 24 months; we ran models with founder power measured at the end of the lock-up period 
instead of at the time of IPO. The pattern of results in these additional analyses is consistent 
with the initial results, providing additional support for our findings.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 & 10 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
                                                 
4 We note that this was the key drawback of the longitudinal models with time spells, which is why the role of 
these analyses in our study was to complement and reinforce—rather than replace—our main cross-sectional 
models with a 24-month cut-off point for exit via IPO.  
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STUDY 2 
Despite its empirical strength, Study 1 has some inherent methodological limitations: 
we could not (1) control for all possible alternative explanations as we lack personal data for 
the founders that could affect their exit decisions (e.g., state of health and marriage status), (2) 
empirically establish the direction of causality, (3) exclude the possibility that managerial 
partial exits were involuntary, and (4) capture the underlying mechanism for the power-exit 
relationships (thus, we cannot support or reject Hypothesis 2). To tackle the above limitations, 
we complement the archival data of Study 1 with two laboratory experiments in which we 
randomly assigned participants to conditions of high versus low power at IPO. This method 
using scenario-based experiments is known as the “factorial survey approach” (Rossi & 
Anderson, 1982), to which we now turn.  
First Experiment 
The first experiment was designed to test the causality of the relationship between 
founder power and both full and partial exits after IPO. To increase ecological validity, we 
recruited 181 participants directly involved in the entrepreneurial ecosystem in London—
namely, nascent entrepreneurs (75), active entrepreneurs (64), exited entrepreneurs (13), and 
entrepreneurship mentors (29). We recruited participants from formal programs dedicated to 
creating and growing start-ups (e.g., incubators and accelerators). Most of the participants were 
male (61.33%), the mean age was 29.13 years (S.D. = 7.09), and 42.54% of the participants 
had entrepreneurship experience (i.e., had started at least one venture). To avoid leading 
participants to conclusions, we did not brief them about the study’s purpose; we simply 
explained to them that because of their interest in entrepreneurship, they were selected to 
participate in a brief experiment. 
We randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions: high or low power at the 
time of IPO. We presented participants with a scenario (vignette) that portrayed them as a co-
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founder of a venture that had just achieved an IPO and then described their respective 
conditions regarding power. We merged the power dimensions into a single description (the 
equivalent of a power index) to create the two alternative conditions (see Table 11). There is 
no significant difference in participants’ gender, age, or prior entrepreneurial experience across 
the two conditions, which indicates that the random allocation of subjects to the two conditions 
worked well. After reading the scenario, participants indicated the likelihood that they would 
exit the described firm with a full exit, a managerial partial exit, and a financial partial exit 
using a seven-point scale (1 = very low likelihood to 7 = very high likelihood). We note that in 
the design of the experiment, we did not provide information about financial gains. We wanted 
participants to focus on the information we presented them about their power position, keeping 
financial gains (and other alternative predictors of exit) ‘out of the picture’. Even if participants 
thought about potential financial gains, and/or differed in their perceptions of how much money 
they could make by exiting, this would unlikely influence the results because we randomly 
assigned participants to either the treatment or the control group. Indeed, random assignment 
is one of the key advantages of an experimental design, in which the researcher can focus on 
the treatment effect without other systematic differences between the two groups.” 
To test Hypotheses 1 and 3, we compared the means for the likelihood of exit for the 
different exit options across the two power conditions using t-statistics (see Table 11). The 
results show that founder power at IPO significantly and negatively affects the likelihood of 
full exit (mean difference = 1.806, p < 0.001, Cohen's d effect size = 1.088). The effect of 
founder power at IPO on managerial partial exit is also negative and significant (mean 
difference = 0.929, p = 0.001, Cohen's d effect size = 0.519) but significantly weaker (by 
52.30%, p < 0.001) than the effect of power on full exit. Finally, founder power does not 
significantly affect partial financial exit (mean difference = -0.228, p = 0.315, Cohen's d 
effect size = -0.150) and is significantly weaker (by 113.79%, p < 0.001) than the effect of 
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power on full exit. The pattern of results in the experiment is consistent with the pattern of 
results from the secondary data.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 11 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Second Experiment 
The second experiment replicated the design of the first experiment but had the 
additional aim to test whether frustration mediated the relationship between power and full exit. 
We measured frustration with a seven-item scale selected from Spector’s (1975) item list for 
organizational frustration. We selected items that had face validity for the current context of 
founders at the time of IPO: “I would find that every time I try to do something at work I run 
into obstacles,” “I would feel thwarted in my efforts to be creative,” “I would feel that I am 
accomplishing something worthwhile at work” (reverse coded), “I would enjoy my work” 
(reverse coded), “I would feel trapped in the work,” “I would feel my work is not at all 
fulfilling,” and “I would feel frustrated at work.” We collected responses on a six-point scale 
(-3 = disagree completely to +3 = agree completely). We find the scale to be reliable with a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.86. After reading the scenario of high or low power (the scenarios 
remained the same as in the first experiment), participants were asked to report on how they 
would feel about the situation using the above frustration scale. Subsequently, they indicated 
the likelihood that they would exit the described firm with a full exit, a managerial partial exit, 
and a financial partial exit using the same scales as in the previous experiment.  
We recruited 190 participants enrolled in an MBA program at a London-based business 
school. The participants were managers taking a concentration course in entrepreneurship and 
were aspiring, nascent, or active entrepreneurs. Of the participants, 15.79% had previously set 
up at least one business, 63.16% were male, and the mean age was 30.86 years (S.D. = 7.34). 
We randomly assigned participants to one of the two power conditions. As shown in Table 12, 
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there is no significant difference in participants’ gender, age, or entrepreneurial experience 
across the two conditions. We first used t-tests to test the relationship between power and 
frustration as well as the likelihood of different exit routes (see Table 12). The results show 
that founder power has a significant and negative impact on the likelihood of full exit (mean 
difference = 1.562, p < 0.001, Cohen's d effect size = 0.945) and a significant and negative 
impact on the likelihood of managerial partial exit (mean difference = 1.083, p < 0.001, 
Cohen's d effect size = 0.585). The effect of founder power on managerial partial exit is 
significantly weaker (by 38.10%, p = 0.015) than the effect of power on full exit. Power has 
no significant impact on the likelihood of financial partial exit (mean difference = -0.001, p = 
0.995, Cohen's d effect size = -0.001), which is significantly weaker (by 100.11%, p < 0.001) 
than the effect of power on full exit. These results are consistent with the first experiment and 
with the regression analysis.  
Furthermore, participants in the low-power condition at IPO reported significantly 
greater frustration than those in the high-power condition (mean difference = 1.827, p < 0.001, 
Cohen's d effect size = 1.680). In the bivariate correlation analysis presented in Table 13, we 
observe that frustration is significant and positively associated with full exit (r = 0.49, 
p < 0.001) and managerial partial exit (r = 0.21, p = 0.003) but is not significantly associated 
with financial partial exit (r = 0.01, p = 0.842). 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 12 and 13 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
We used regression analysis to test the mediation effect of frustration on the 
relationship between power and full exit following the three-step procedure outlined by Baron 
and Kenny (1986). As shown in Table 14 and consistent with previous t-tests, the low-power 
condition has a significant positive association with the likelihood of full exit (beta = 1.625, p 
< 0.001) and frustration (beta = 1.846, p < 0.001). In addition, when frustration is included in 
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the full exit model, it has a significant and positive association with the likelihood of full exit 
(beta = 0.462, p < 0.001), whereas the effect of power on the likelihood of full exit is reduced 
(beta = 0.773, p = 0.028), which indicates partial mediation. We also applied a bootstrapping 
technique to confirm the mediating effect of frustration (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The results 
also show a significant indirect effect of power on the likelihood of full exit through frustration 
(beta = 0.852, p < 0.001). These findings provide support for Hypothesis 2. We also note that 
the regression analyses did not indicate a significant relationship between frustration and partial 
exits (managerial or financial). 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 14 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
Robustness Checks for Study 2 
We note that in the experiments, we asked participants to evaluate the probability of 
making each one of the possible decisions rather than forcing them to choose one of the 
alternatives (as in the observational data). Hence, we had a slightly different operationalization 
of the dependent variable in Study 2 than in Study 1. To create a one-to-one comparison 
between the two studies, we developed a robustness check. We reconstructed the dependent 
variable in the experiments as a categorical variable (continuation, full exit, managerial partial 
exit, financial partial exit) based on the highest likelihood in the participants’ answers. We used 
a two-step process. First, we identified a participant’s highest score (capturing the likelihood 
of exiting) among the following alternatives: (1) full exit, (2) managerial partial exit, and (3) 
financial partial exit. Second, we coded the focal respondent with respect to a four-option 
categorical dependent variable. If the highest likelihood was 4 or larger (on a seven-point scale), 
then we assumed that the participant would exit via this focal route. If the highest likelihood 
for an option was 3 or lower, we coded the participant in the continuation category. To have a 
more conservative and “cleaner” coding process, we excluded participants (27 in the first 
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experiment and 23 in the second experiment) whose highest score appeared for more than one 
exit route. Analyses using this measure of exit route produced results consistent with those 
reported for the main analyses above. 
Moreover, it is possible that frustration could predict exit only after it exceeds a certain 
level. To test for this possibility, we coded frustration as a binary variable in two alternative 
ways: a) above the mean versus below the mean and b) above 75% versus below 75%. In both 
these estimations with a binary (categorical) measure of frustration, we found no substantive 
change in the mediation analysis results. 
In sum, given the experimental manipulation of founder power and the random 
assignment of participants to the two conditions, the two laboratory experiments provide 
evidence of the direction of causality and help rule out some alternative explanations. We also 
set founder exit as a voluntary decision in the experiments, thus overcoming the empirical 
limitation of the secondary data (of Study 1) that founders may not choose managerial partial 
exit. Moreover, the second experiment allowed us to test Hypothesis 2 regarding frustration as 
a mechanism underlying the relationship between power and exit.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
IPOs create a great deal of uncertainty for entrepreneurial ventures and their founding 
teams and are characterized by changes in ventures’ control and direction (Fischer & Pollock, 
2004; Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998; Pollock, Rindova, & Maggitti, 2008). IPOs represent 
opportunities for founders to raise funds to grow their businesses and offer them the chance to 
exit. Interestingly, our results show that while most founders continue to be fully involved with 
their firms after IPO (59.75%), a substantial proportion uses an IPO as an exit route. Of the 
founders in our sample, 24.60% fully exited their ventures within 24 months after the lock-up 
period, 10.22% exited from management but kept their shares, and 5.43% sold their shares but 
remained in their firms as employed managers. The main aim of our study was to theorize and 
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test the association of founders’ power at the time of IPO with their likelihood of exiting their 
ventures via IPO with a full exit, a managerial partial exit, and a financial partial exit.  
Consistent with our model, the results show that founders with less power at the time 
of IPO are more likely to fully exit via IPO than maintain involvement with their ventures. This 
finding is robust across models and studies, and the results hold for multiple dimensions of 
power—namely, structural, ownership, expertise, and prestige power. Based on our 
experimental design, we also find that founders’ frustration mediates the relationship between 
founders’ lack of power and the decision to fully exit from the venture. Furthermore, we find 
that power is more influential on full exits than partial exits, and it appears that power is more 
influential on managerial partial exits than on financial partial exits. Indeed, we find that 
founder power has a non-significant relationship with financial partial exits.  
Overall, we can portray the effect of founder power on exit via IPO along a continuum. 
A full exit is strongly related to power, managerial partial exit has a weak association with 
power, and financial partial exit does not appear to be related to power. We theorized that if 
the focal actors lack power over their projects, they would become frustrated and disassociate 
from them. Thus, full exit is a vigorous response to frustration, and this response is a possible 
reason why full exit is strongly related to low founder power at IPO. Managerial partial exit 
could also be a more moderate response. Withdrawing from one’s managerial role provides 
immediate relief from the day-to-day issues arising from low power while maintaining 
ownership shares still links the founder to the venture.  
Although not hypothesized, we also find that founders’ partial exits are associated with 
founder and financial factors unrelated to power. Specifically, managerial partial exits are 
positively related to founders’ age and experience as a serial entrepreneur. These relationships 
suggest possible career motivations for managerial partial exits. For example, perhaps older 
founders are tired of running their businesses and wish to retire from management while 
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retaining their ownership shares. Serial entrepreneurs could choose managerial exit to allow 
them to redeploy their managerial attention to other new ventures. In contrast, financial partial 
exit is positively related to hot periods in the IPO market, which points to a financial motivation 
for this form of partial exit. Financial partial exits are also related to gender (males are more 
likely to use a financial partial exit), which could be explained by findings showing that men 
are more motivated to make money than women on average (Cromie, 1987). 
A more detailed view of the results reveals that while, in some of the models, lack of 
structural power is related to managerial partial exit and ownership power is related to financial 
partial exit, expertise power is not significantly related to partial exit but is significantly related 
to full exit. Interestingly, this evidence supports our assumption that partial exits are 
independent choices from full exit as opposed to full exit simply being the union of managerial 
and financial partial exits. Future research can explore how and why different dimensions 
impact the type and likelihood of exit differently and in combination (e.g., interactions and 
configurations). Although there is more work to be done, this paper’s findings provide a 
number of theoretical contributions, to which we now turn. 
Theoretical Contributions 
The above model and findings provide a number of insights into the exit literature 
specifically and the entrepreneurship literature more broadly. First, entrepreneurship research 
has largely focused on founders creating (De Carolis, Litzky, & Eddleston, 2009; Eesley, 2016; 
Haveman, Habinek, & Goodman, 2012; Newbert & Tornikoski, 2012) and growing their 
ventures (Davidsson, 1991; Delmar & Wiklund, 2008; McKelvie & Wiklund, 2010), but less 
scholarly attention has focused on founders exiting their ventures (DeTienne, 2010; DeTienne, 
et al., 2015). The little research on founder exit has focused on involuntary exit (under 
conditions of high performance [Wasserman, 2003] and low performance [Laitinen, 1992; 
Wiklund, et al., 2010]) and exit to avoid bankruptcy (Gimeno et al., 1997; Thorburn, 2000; 
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Wennberg et al., 2010). We extend this research to founders’ voluntary exits from their 
ventures via IPO and, in doing so, begin to address calls for research on why founders decide 
to leave their successful ventures (DeTienne & Wennberg, 2016). Specifically, by explaining 
why founders decide to exit their high-potential ventures (i.e., those going public [Hochberg, 
et al., 2007; Shane & Stuart, 2002]), we gain new insights into the entrepreneurial decision-
making process leading to an important action—exit—based on low founder power. 
Second, whether about exit strategies (Bruce & Picard, 2006; Ryan & Power, 2012), 
exit modes (DeTienne, et al., 2015; Wennberg, et al., 2010) or the likelihood of exit (Cefis & 
Marsili, 2012; DeTienne et al., 2008; Gimeno et al., 1997), research on founder exit has largely 
focused on full exit as the outcome. The implicit assumption of this exit research is that 
founders’ options are to either fully exit from or fully continue with their ventures. However, 
we find that exit is more nuanced than this dichotomous categorization—there are instances 
when founders neither fully exit nor fully continue with their ventures but rather partially exit. 
Founders partially exit by withdrawing managerially or financially from their ventures, and 
these partial exits differ from full exits in terms of the role of power: power is more influential 
in the latter than in the former. More research is needed to explain the antecedents and 
consequences of the different forms of partial exit vis-à-vis each other, full exit, and 
continuation. 
Third, although the literature has acknowledged the role of power in exit (Jain & Tabak, 
2008; Pollock et al., 2009), power has largely been explored from the decision-making 
perspective of stockholders who “force out” individuals from the CEO position (some of whom 
are also founders [Wasserman, 2003]). We explore power from a different perspective—the 
founder’s perspective. In this study, we provide new insights into how founders’ power 
influences their full exit via IPO. Indeed, taking the founder’s perspective enables insights into 
the mechanisms linking power to exit. Specifically, we introduce an emotional component to 
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the exit decision by highlighting how founders’ frustration mediates the relationship between 
power and exit. In doing so, we also meet calls for more entrepreneurship research to 
investigate the role of various emotions in the entrepreneurial decision-making process (Baron, 
2008; Cardon, Foo, Shepherd, & Wiklund, 2012), to which we now turn. 
Fourth, the entrepreneurship literature, in general, has begun to highlight the important 
role of emotions at various stages of the entrepreneurial process (Baron, 2008; Cardon et al., 
2005). For example, research has highlighted the importance of passion in the creation and 
emergence of new organizations (Cardon et al., 2009; Uy et al., 2017), positive emotions in 
sustaining the effort needed to manage an entrepreneurial venture (Foo, Uy, & Baron, 2009; 
Gielnik, Uy, Funken, & Bischoff, 2017), and entrepreneurs’ grief over the “death” of their 
businesses (Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd, et al., 2009). We extend this emerging stream of 
research by theorizing and finding that frustration is a key mechanism underlying the power-
exit relationship. Future research might find that frustration is an important mediator (or 
moderator) of other key relationships in different stages of the entrepreneurial process. For 
example, perhaps frustration is an important mechanism explaining the breakdown of social 
relationships critical to the success of entrepreneurial teams, the success of acquisitions and 
mergers as part of growth strategies, and customers as sources of innovation. With a better 
understanding of frustration, entrepreneurs are likely to be better positioned to avoid, manage, 
or regulate this emotion when making decisions about exiting their ventures. 
Finally, our theorizing and findings on frustration also contribute to power theory 
(Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Nakauchi & Wiersema, 2015) by changing 
the way we think about the mechanisms by which managerial power impacts exit. The exit 
literature on power has argued that managers’ lack of power leads to involuntary dismissal via 
a coercive mechanism—that is, managers are forced out of their jobs by powerful stakeholders 
(Allen & Panian, 1982; Boeker, 1992; Ocasio, 1994; Weisbach, 1988). In this study we 
 40 
highlight an alternative emotional mechanism (i.e., frustration) to explain how power 
influences managers’ (in our context, founders’) decision to exit from their high-potential 
ventures. Also, we put forward the novel thesis that this frustration mechanism is stronger for 
full exits than for partial exits. The reported weak or non-significant effects of power on partial 
exits are an integral part of our theoretical contribution because they demonstrate the boundary 
conditions of the frustration mechanism. The latter is emotional, and we show that while it 
applies for full exits (a vigorous withdrawal response to frustration), it is less relevant for partial 
exits, which, because of their nature (the founder keeps an association with the venture), are 
less emotional decisions (at least in terms of frustration). 
Practical Implications 
We echo Wasserman’s (2008) message that founders face a “rich versus king” dilemma. 
If staying in the business and remaining influential (i.e., being the king) is a personal goal for 
the founder, then reducing power to obtain investment is likely to be a poor decision. Our 
results show that given the founder’s goals, reduced power would cause frustration to lead to 
exit. In contrast, those founders who accept that their main goal is to become wealthy might be 
more prepared to share power with investors without becoming so frustrated and could exit the 
business consciously (often partially) to improve venture performance (Wasserman, 2017) or 
achieve other life goals. The main message from our results for entrepreneurs is that if they 
clarify their goals and recognize the implications of their strategies, they can better manage 
their emotions and make sound exit decisions. 
Moreover, our findings have implications for investors, who need to realize that 
reducing the power of founders may cause frustration and lead them to fully exit their firms. 
When the founder’s invovlement is no longer needed for venture success, full exit might be a 
good outcome for investors. However, if some founder involvement is beneficial to the firm, 
then investors could work with the founder to help find a suitable partial exit. Indeed, the effect 
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of the exact role played by founders after partial exits on future venture performance is an 
important area for further research. For example, what are the implications when a founder 
who engages in a managerial partial exit still exerts influence on board decisions via large 
ownership? 
Limitations and Future Research 
This paper advances knowledge on the relationship between power and exit but has 
certain limitations. In our first study, as in other studies using secondary sources of data to 
investigate exit, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact mechanisms underlying founder exit. For 
example, we cannot distinguish between cases of founders whose decision to exit influenced 
their structural power at IPO from cases of founders whose structural power at IPO influenced 
their subsequent exit decision. In our defense, the power dimensions, apart from structural 
power, could be considered exogenous to the IPO event: founder ownership is mostly 
determined by valuations, while expertise and prestige are built over the long term and are not 
necessarily related to the IPO event. Our experiments (Study 2) were a major empirical step 
toward resolving issues of causality, thus complementing our findings from Study 1. Also, we 
focused only on IPOs on the LSE and are conscious that generalizing our results to different 
geographies and IPO markets requires replications and perhaps theoretical extensions. 
Additionally, although we investigated power through its dimensions and as an index, we find 
that founder power is not a monolith (e.g., technical expertise power is negatively associated 
with ownership and prestige power). Future research can explore the inter-relationship of the 
power dimensions (including their configurations) and their relationships to both founder 
frustration and exit. Finally, in this study, we did not consider how financial gain might tie into 
frustration. Founders may be more or less willing to deal with frustration if they stand to gain 
a substantial amount by exiting or staying at their company. Future research could provide a 
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more thorough consideration of how financial upside or gain might interact with frustration to 
drive founder exit. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we set out to understand why and how founders’ power impacts their 
decisions to exit their ventures via IPO. We learned that low founder power likely leads to a 
full exit and that this relationship is mediated by frustration. This power-frustration-exit 
relationship contributes to our understanding of (1) entrepreneurial exit by extending 
knnowledge of why founders leave their high-potential ventures (i.e., those going public), (2) 
power and leader succession by taking the perspective of the founder and his or her reasons for 
exit, and (3) entrepreneurial decision making by introducing the mediating role of founder 
frustration (an important emotion) in the power-exit relationship. We hope that these new 
insights trigger additional research to further advance our understanding of founder exit. 
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Appendix: A Brief Description of the Exploratory Interviews 
 
We conducted nine qualitative interviews with founders in 2016 and 2017—seven men and 
two women. Seven individuals had exited and two had continued with their firms. Our aim 
was to understand why founders exit via IPO and, more specifically, to explore whether and 
how lack of power leads to exit. The interviews were semi-structured and lasted 60–90 
minutes. In general, we asked interviewees to recall and reflect on why they exited (or not), 
to explain their thinking process and the practicalities of the exit (or continuation) decision, 
and to describe how they felt before and after the decision to exit (or continue).  
 
The interviews revealed a frustration-based mechanism for the relationship between lack 
power and full exit. We used this insight and tested the frustration mechanism with an 
experimental design. We do not claim that the interviews followed a formal qualitative 
methodology. The “sample” was based on convenience; we first managed to convince four 
IPO founders in our list to talk to us and then used their contacts to snowball to other 
founders that became available.  
 
We use anecdotal quotes from the exploratory interviews to bring life to our theoretical 
claims. The technique was used in other papers (see Pontikes & Barnett, 2017; Wasserman, 
2003). The interviews offer complementary material to our theoretical arguments and also 
provide some evidence of the practical importance of the topic. The cases are briefly 
presented in the table below: 
 
Case 
number 
(name) 
Industry of the Venture Founder’s Role at 
the Time of Exit 
Decision 
Decision/Type of Exit Founder’s Role 
Subsequent to  Exit 
Decision  
1  Pharmaceuticals CEO  
 
Managerial exit Set up new startup 
2  Chemicals CTO Full exit Set up new startup 
3  Energy CTO Financial exit CTO 
4  Media CEO Full exit Set up new startup 
5  IT/Digital media CEO Continued  CEO 
6  Media CEO Managerial exit Spend more time with 
family 
7  IT CEO Full exit Angel investor 
8  Media CEO Full exit Angel investor 
9  Manufacturing CEO Continued CEO 
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Table 1. Entrepreneurial Exit Routes after IPO (N = 313) 
 
      Selling Out Shares  
No Yes 
Leaving TMT 
No 
Continuation  
(59.75%)  
Partial financial 
exit  
(5.43%) 
Yes 
Partial managerial 
exit (10.22%) 
Full exit 
(24.60%) 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
  
Variables Mean S.D. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 
Founder fully exits the 
business 0.25 0.43                      
2 
Founder financially exits the 
business 0.05 0.23 -0.14*                     
3 
Founder managerially exits the 
business 0.10 0.30 -0.19*** -0.08                    
4 
CEO/chairperson status 
0.43 0.54 -0.10+ -0.02 -0.07                   
5 
Ownership relative to the 
largest shareholder 0.64 0.37 -0.15** -0.04 -0.02 0.20***                  
6 
Inventor/main product 
developer 0.14 0.34 -0.16** 0.11* -0.04 -0.11* -0.16**                 
7 
Experience in related 
industries  13.39 9.83 -0.16** -0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.09 0.10+                
8 
Directorships in other 
businesses 7.31 9.39 -0.11* 0.03 -0.03 0.19*** 0.16** -0.22*** -0.05               
9 
News mentioned the founder 
before IPOa 1.44 1.21 -0.07 -0.12* -0.03 0.21*** 0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.04              
10 
Serial entrepreneur  
0.29 0.45 -0.01 -0.03 0.16** 0.14** 0.13* -0.07 0.01 0.17** 0.00             
11 
Founder’s age 
46.32 8.66 0.08 -0.11* 0.07 0.03 -0.15** 0.11* 0.30*** 0.07 0.03 0.08            
12 
Female entrepreneur 
0.07 0.25 -0.03 -0.06 0.12* -0.09+ 0.04 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.01           
13 
Board size 
5.80 1.60 -0.12* -0.09+ 0.12* -0.09 -0.15** 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.20*** -0.06 0.08 0.04          
14 
Board seats by other founders 
(%) 0.36 0.17 -0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.12* 0.01 -0.16** 0.00 0.09 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.14*         
15 
Ownership holdings by other 
founders 0.14 0.14 -0.11* -0.07 0.08 -0.24*** 0.14** -0.13* -0.06 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.14** 0.55***        
16 
Ownership holdings by 
institutional investors 0.23 0.22 0.04 -0.05 -0.09+ -0.07 -0.62*** 0.28*** 0.13* -0.16** 0.07 -0.12* 0.15** -0.05 0.15** -0.20*** -0.37***       
17 
Average market value of the 
businessa 2.87 1.35 -0.15** -0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.26*** -0.01 0.14* -0.01 0.22*** 0.00 0.13* -0.01 0.39*** 0.05 0.08 0.26***      
18 
Business turnover growth 
before IPO 2.94 17.46 -0.08 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.08 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.08 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03     
19 
Firm age (month) 
56.08 32.38 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 0.08 -0.08 0.13* -0.06 0.23*** -0.12* 0.04 0.00 0.11+ -0.18** -0.09 -0.02 0.12* -0.01    
20 
Hi-tech firm 
0.20 0.40 0.04 0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.13* 0.19*** 0.10+ -0.06 -0.07 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.19*** -0.21*** 0.18*** -0.06 -0.04 -0.03   
21 
IPO in the hot period 
0.52 0.50 0.03 0.15** -0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.09 -0.01 -0.05 0.11* -0.06 0.03 0.08 -0.10+ 0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 0.13* 0.11+  
22 
Length of lock-up period 
13.09 3.69 -0.00 0.07 -0.09+ 0.02 0.07 0.18** -0.05 -0.07 0.14** -0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 0.08 0.16** 
                     a In log form, + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Different Exit Routes 
 
 
  Continuation Full Exit  
Partial 
Managerial 
Exit 
Partial 
Financial Exit 
Structural power: Founder is the CEO  35.29% 22.08% 18.75% 17.65% 
Structural power: Founder is the 
chairman of the board 
9.09% 9.09% 12.5% 5.88% 
Structural power: Founder holds a 
combination title of CEO and chairman 
of the board 
2.14% 1.30% 0 11.76% 
Founder’s ownership proportion 17.93% 10.53% 14.76% 14.82% 
Ownership power: Founder’s 
ownership relative to the ownership of 
the largest shareholder 
68.35% 53.91% 66.61% 57.55% 
Expertise power: Founder is the 
inventor or main developer 
17.11% 3.90% 9.38% 29.41% 
Expertise power: Founder’s experience 
in related industries 
14.58 10.58 13.84 12.12 
Prestige power: Founder’s 
directorships in other businesses 
8.09 5.49 6.50 8.53 
Prestige power: News mentioning the 
founder before IPO 
15.20 12.00 8.41 5.24 
Serial entrepreneur 26.20% 28.57% 50.00% 23.53% 
Founder’s age 45.84 47.60 48.13 42.29 
IPO in the hot period 49.73% 54.55% 43.75% 82.35% 
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Table 4. Association of Founder Power at IPO with Full Exit 
Variables 
Full Exit from the Business within 24 Months after the 
Lock-Up Period 
Serial entrepreneur  -0.041 0.044 
  （0.191) (0.201) 
Founder’s age 0.016 0.027* 
  （0.010) (0.012) 
Female entrepreneur -0.233 -0.212 
  （0.320) (0.324) 
Board size -0.071 -0.108 
  (0.069) (0.077) 
Board seats by other founders (%) -0.253 -0.575 
  (0.729) (0.766) 
Ownership holdings by other founders -0.408 -1.069 
  (0.856) (1.007) 
Ownership holdings by institutional investors 0.244 -0.311 
  (0.488) (0.580) 
Average market value of the businessa -0.148+ -0.178* 
  (0.081) (0.075) 
Turnover growth within three years before IPO -0.159* -0.142+ 
  (0.072) (0.075) 
Firm age  -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Hi-tech firm 0.110 0.182 
  (0.259) (0.275) 
Length of lock-up period -0.010 0.012 
  (0.025) (0.024) 
IPO in the hot period 0.041 0.038 
  (0.191) (0.200) 
Structural power: Founder’s CEO/chairman status 
 
-0.293+ 
  
 
(0.162) 
Ownership power: Founder’s ownership relative to the 
largest shareholder 
 
-0.907** 
  
 
(0.295) 
Expertise power: Founder is the inventor or main developer 
 
-1.402*** 
  
 
(0.382) 
Expertise power: Founder’s experience in related industry  
 
-0.028** 
  
 
(0.009) 
Prestige power: Founder’s directorships in other businesses 
 
-0.026** 
  
 
(0.010) 
Prestige power: News mentioning the founder before IPOa 
 
0.024 
  
 
(0.078) 
Constant -0.231 0.860 
  (0.677) (0.774) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.081 0.217 
Observation 313 313 
a In log form, + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 5. Multinomial Regression on Entrepreneurial Exit 
    
Variables Full Exit 
Partial 
Managerial Exit 
Partial 
Financial Exit 
Structural power: Founder’s CEO/chairperson status -0.558+ -0.635 -0.203 
  (0.304) (0.484) (0.478) 
Ownership power: Founder’s ownership relative to the largest 
shareholder 
-1.694** -1.010 -0.895 
  (0.569) (0.820) (0.824) 
Expertise power: Founder is the inventor or main developer -2.649** -0.764 0.751 
  (0.921) (0.886) (0.766) 
Expertise power: Founder’s experience in related industry  -0.056*** -0.022 -0.031 
  (0.016) (0.024) (0.032) 
Prestige power: Founder’s directorships in other businesses -0.049** -0.038 0.038 
  (0.019) (0.026) (0.027) 
Prestige power: News mentioning the founder before IPOa -0.023 -0.083 -1.000* 
  (0.143) (0.188) (0.450) 
Serial entrepreneur  0.319 1.345** 0.032 
  (0.368) (0.438) (0.693) 
Founder’s age 0.056* 0.052* -0.059 
  (0.023) (0.026) (0.054) 
Female entrepreneur -0.142 1.320* -12.459*** 
  (0.596) (0.660) (0.620) 
Board size -0.151 0.246+ -0.583* 
  (0.143) (0.150) (0.266) 
Board seats by other founders (%) -0.611 1.265 -3.079 
  (1.335) (1.438) (2.075) 
Ownership holdings by other founders -2.537 -1.983 -1.062 
  (1.822) (2.178) (2.440) 
Ownership holdings by institutional investors -1.040 -3.291* 0.445 
  (1.182) (1.559) (1.562) 
Average market value of the businessa -0.312* -0.000 0.304 
  (0.132) (0.179) (0.214) 
Business turnover growth within three years before IPO -0.292+ -0.015 -0.127 
  (0.153) (0.016) (0.162) 
Firm age  0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Hi-tech firm 0.486 0.460 -0.133 
  (0.520) (0.636) (0.902) 
Length of lock-up period 0.020 -0.106 0.052 
  (0.041) (0.093) (0.085) 
IPO in the hot period 0.152 -0.164 1.916** 
  (0.376) (0.457) (0.781) 
Constant 1.443 -2.573 3.707+ 
  (1.508) (1.974) (1.942) 
Pseudo R2   
 
0.224 
Observation 313      
a In log form, + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 6. The Relationship between Founder Power Index and Full Exit 
  
Variables Fully exit from the business 
Founder's power index -0.188*** 
 (0.034) 
Serial entrepreneur 0.102 
  (0.206) 
Age of founder 0.021* 
 (0.010) 
Female entrepreneur -0.291 
 (0.320) 
Size of the board -0.088 
 (0.067) 
Board seats by other founders (%) -0.207 
 (0.705) 
Ownerships holding by other founders -1.265 
 (0.879) 
Ownership holding by institutional investors -0.514 
 (0.562) 
Average market value of founder holding shares a -0.070+ 
 (0.040) 
Total assets of business a -0.053 
 (0.054) 
Turnover growth within 3 years before IPO -0.134* 
 (0.065) 
Firm age -0.001 
 (0.004) 
Hi-tech firm 0.034 
 (0.277) 
Length of lock-up period 0.011 
 (0.025) 
IPO in a hot period 0.029 
 (0.197) 
Constant 0.751 
 (1.060) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.188 
Observations 313 
 
a In log form + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 63 
 
Table 7. The Relationships between Founder Power Index at IPO and Multiple Exit Routes 
    
Variables Full Exit 
Partially 
Managerial Exit 
Partially 
Financial Exit 
Founder's power index -0.351*** -0.283** -0.083 
  (0.068) (0.111) (0.135) 
Serial entrepreneur  0.485 1.272** 0.142 
  (0.370) (0.449) (0.617) 
Age of founder 0.036+ 0.054+ -0.059 
  (0.019) (0.029) (0.050) 
Female entrepreneur -0.322 1.321+ -13.612*** 
  (0.613) (0.700) (1.563) 
Size of the board -0.107 0.257* -0.263 
  (0.121) (0.129) (0.291) 
Board seats by other founders (%) -0.151 1.746 -0.581 
  (1.216) (1.343) (1.913) 
Ownerships holding by other founders -2.390+ -2.336 -2.118 
  (1.528) (2.088) (3.100) 
Ownership holding by institutional investors -1.338 -2.958+ 0.938 
  (1.132) (1.693) (1.520) 
Average market value of founder holding shares a -0.263* 0.050 -0.399** 
  (0.087) (0.172) (0.133) 
Total assets of business a -0.100 0.050 0.003 
  (0.095) (0.145) (0.177) 
Turnover growth within 3 years before IPO -0.261* -0.015 -0.117 
  (0.134) (0.016) (0.230) 
Firm age  -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Hi-tech firm 0.110 0.485 0.345 
  (0.521) (0.620) (0.739) 
Length of lock-up period 0.015 -0.092 0.080 
  (0.043) (0.082) (0.093) 
IPO in a hot period 0.191 -0.088 1.394+ 
  (0.372) (0.474) (0.803) 
Constant 3.417 -6.371* 6.062+ 
  (2.214) (2.889) (3.198) 
Pseudo R2       0.211 
Observation 313     
a in log form, + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p<.001  
 
 64 
 
Table 8. Margin Effect Comparison of Founder Power on Different Exit Routes 
   
  
Decrease 
in Power 
by 
Full Exit Managerial Exit Financial Exit 
Full Exit  
vs.  
Managerial Exit 
Full Exit  
vs.  
Financial Exit 
Structural power: 
Founder CEO/ 
chairperson 
1 unit in 
the scale 
6.20% 3.79% 0.08% 2.41% 6.13% 
Ownership power: 
Founder’s ownership 
relative to the largest 
shareholder 
1 standard 
deviation 
7.62% 1.50% 0.61% 6.12% + 7.02% * 
Expertise power: 
Founder inventor/ 
main developer 
1 unit in 
the scale 
24.69% 2.49% -7.12% 22.20% ** 31.81% *** 
Expertise power: 
Founder’s experience 
in related industries 
1 standard 
deviation 
6.88% 0.39% 0.59% 6.49% * 6.29% ** 
Prestige power: 
Founder’s 
directorships in other 
businesses 
1 standard 
deviation 
6.10% 1.88% -2.16% 4.23% 8.26% ** 
Prestige power: News 
mentioning the 
foundera 
1 standard 
deviation 
-1.20% 0.45% 5.07% -1.65% -6.27%+ 
Power Index 
1 standard 
deviation 
11.05% 3.85% -0.77% 7.45% * 11.82% *** 
a In log form, + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
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Table 9. Association of Founder Power after the Lock-Up Period with Full Exit 
   
Variables 
Full Exit from the Business after the 
Lock-Up Period 
Structural power: Founder’s CEO/chairperson status -1.241*** 
  (0.357) 
Ownership power: Founder’s ownership relative to the largest 
shareholder 
-1.996*** 
  (0.438) 
Expertise power: Founder is the inventor or main developer -1.585** 
  (0.601) 
Expertise power: Founder’s experience in related industries -0.036** 
  (0.014) 
Prestige power: Founder’s directorships in other businesses -0.022+ 
  (0.013) 
Prestige power: News mentioning the founder before IPOa 0.189 
  (0.143) 
Serial entrepreneur  0.362 
  (0.304) 
Founder’s age 0.037* 
  (0.018) 
Female entrepreneur 0.352 
  (0.370) 
Ownership holdings by institutional investors -0.554 
  (0.679) 
Total assets of the businessa -0.342*** 
  (0.095) 
Business turnover growth -0.066 
  (0.073) 
IPO in the hot period 0.162 
  (0.275) 
Constant 2.354 
  (1.443) 
Log-likelihood  -195.393 
Observations 1092 
a In log form, + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
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Table 10. Multinomial Regression on Entrepreneurial Exit (after the Lock-Up Period) 
    
Variables Full Exit 
Partial 
Managerial Exit 
Partial  
Financial Exit 
Structural Power: Founder’s CEO/chairperson status -1.379*** -1.606*** -0.006 
  (0.377) (0.423) (0.438) 
Ownership power: Founder’s ownership relative to the 
largest shareholder 
-2.325*** -0.124 -10.152*** 
  (0.576) (0.692) (3.196) 
Expertise power: Founder is the inventor or main 
developer 
-1.958** 0.190 -0.124 
  (0.698) (0.542) (0.650) 
Expertise power: Founder’s experience in related 
industries 
-0.045** 0.001 0.005 
  (0.017) (0.022) (0.028) 
Prestige power: Founder’s directorships in other 
businesses 
-0.028+ -0.006 -0.009 
  (0.015) (0.018) (0.034) 
Prestige power: News mentioning the foundera 0.121 -0.136 0.038 
  (0.160) (0.175) (0.221) 
Serial entrepreneur  0.658+ 1.191** 1.228* 
  (0.368) (0.405) (0.570) 
Founder’s age 0.056** 0.036 0.013 
  (0.022) (0.025) (0.032) 
Female entrepreneur 0.128 0.471 -12.462*** 
  (0.498) (0.563) (0.775) 
Ownership holding by institutional investors 0.321 0.619 -1.570 
  (0.878) (1.067) (1.033) 
Total assets of the businessa -0.388*** 0.093 -0.314+ 
  (0.112) (0.118) (0.177) 
Business turnover growth -0.081 0.004 -0.052 
  (0.088) (0.054) (0.051) 
IPO in the hot period 0.232 -0.179 1.265* 
  (0.321) (0.384) (0.518) 
Constant 2.791 -5.248* 3.648 
  (1.763) (2.286) (3.006) 
Pseudo R2   
 
0.231 
Observations 1049      
a In log form, + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, 
*** p < .001 
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Table 11. Scenarios and Results (T-Test) for the First Experiment 
 
High-Power Scenario Low-Power Scenario 
You are the cofounder of an entrepreneurial venture. 
After five years of hard work, you have just 
completed an initial public offering (IPO). You feel 
that despite the turmoil of the IPO process, you ended 
up with a position of power in the firm. You are the 
CEO and a member of the board of directors, you 
own a substantial proportion of the equity, and your 
technical and managerial expertise is needed for the 
company to progress. You are also a high-profile 
founder sitting on the board of other firms and often 
appearing in the media. 
You are the cofounder of an entrepreneurial 
venture. After five years of hard work, you have 
just completed an initial public offering (IPO). 
You feel that in the turmoil of the IPO process, 
you ended up with a low-power position in the 
firm. You are not the CEO or the chairperson of 
the board, you own a relatively small proportion 
of the equity, and your technical and managerial 
expertise is not enough anymore for the 
company to progress. You are also a low-profile 
founder with few external board seats or 
appearances in the media. 
 
Condition N Full Exit 
Partial Managerial 
Exit 
Partial  
Financial Exit 
Low power at IPO 88 4.386 4.67 2.159 
(S.D.) 
 
(1.790) （1.747） （1.294） 
High power at IPO 93 2.581 3.742 2.387 
(S.D.)  
 
(1.527) （1.829） （1.707） 
Difference  
 
1.806*** 0.929*** -0.228 
(t-statistics)   (7.313) (3.489) ( -1.008) 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
T-Test for Control Variables 
Condition N Age Female Experienced Entrepreneur 
Low power at IPO 88  29.193 0.420 0.398 
(S.D.) 
 
(7.144) (0.496) (0.492) 
High power at IPO 93 29.065 0.355 0.452 
(S.D.)  
 
(7.074) (0.481) (0.500) 
Difference  
 
0.129 0.066 -0.054 
(t-statistics)   (0.122) (0.903) (-0.730) 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Table 12. T-Tests for the Second Experiment 
 
Condition   Frustration Full Exit 
Partial Managerial 
Exit 
Partial Financial 
Exit 
Low power at IPO 87 0.823 4.494 4.597 2.241 
(S.D.)   (1.145) (1.649) （1.985） （1.414） 
High power at IPO 103 -1.004 2.932 3.515 2.243 
(S.D.)   (1.037) (1.658) （1.731） （1.382） 
Difference 190 1.827*** 1.562*** 1.083*** -0.001 
(t-statistics)   (11.534) (6.487) (4.017) (-0.007) 
T-test for Control Variables 
Condition  Age Female Experienced Entrepreneur 
Low power at IPO 87 30.310 0.333 0.195 
(S.D.)  (6.503) (0.474) （0.399） 
High power at IPO 103 31.320 0.398 0.126 
(S.D.)  (7.978) (0.492) （0.334） 
Difference 190 1.010 0.065 -0.069 
(t-statistics)  (0.945) (0.919) (-1.302) 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for the Second Experiment 
           
  Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Full exit 3.65 1.82        
2 Partial managerial exit 4.01 1.92 0.23***      
3 Partial financial exit 2.24 1.39 0.08 -0.06      
4 Low-power condition 0.46 0.50 0.43*** 0.28*** -0.00     
5 Frustration -0.17 1.42 0.49*** 0.21** 0.01 0.64***   
6 Age 30.86 7.34 0.12+ -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 0.01   
7 Female 0.37 0.48 -0.03 0.09 0.17* -0.07 0.07 -0.26*** 
8 
Experienced 
entrepreneur 0.16 0.37 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.16* 0.14+ -0.00 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 14. Mediation Analysis for the Effect of Frustration  
 
Variable Frustration Full Exit  
Partial  
Managerial Exit 
Partial 
 Financial Exit 
Age 0.016 0.041* 0.034+ -0.010 -0.011 0.004 0.005 
  (0.012) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) 
Female  0.409* 0.179 -0.010 0.381 0.361 0.496* 0.502* 
  (0.167) (0.257) (0.254) (0.301) (0.318) (0.211) (0.212) 
Entrepreneurial 
experience 
0.346 -0.143 -0.303 0.073 0.056 0.054 0.058 
  (0.238) (0.339) (0.309) (0.343) (0.344) (0.268) (0.267) 
Low power at IPO 1.846*** 1.625*** 0.773* 1.093*** 1.003** 0.031 0.058 
  (0.160) (0.242) (0.348) (0.280) (0.354) (0.205) (0.250) 
Mediator               
Frustration     0.462***   0.049   -0.014 
      (0.118)   (0.128)   (0.085) 
C -1.716***  1.589* 2.381*** 3.667*** 3.750*** 1.901*** 1.877*** 
   (0.402) (0.688) (0.674) (0.687) (0.742) (0.516) (0.539) 
R-squared 0.445  0.208 0.279 0.092 0.092 0.028 0.028 
N 190             
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
